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char miller

The Once and Future Forest Service:
Land-Management Policies and Politics in
Contemporary America

The news from the Far North is not good. In the spring of 2007, University
of Alberta scientists reported that portions of the Canadian tundra were
transforming into new forests of spruce and shrubs much more rapidly
than once was imaginable. “The conventional thinking on treeline dynamics has been that advances are very slow because conditions are so harsh at
these high latitudes and altitudes,” reported Dr. Ryan Danby, a member of
the UA research team. “But what our data indicate is that there was an
upslope surge of trees in response to warmer temperatures. It’s like [the forest] waited until conditions were just right, then it decided to get up and
run, not just walk.”1
The multifaceted impact of global climate change is chilling. As tundra
converts to forest cover, species and their habitats must move higher up or die
off. Sheep and caribou are already responding to the environmental transformation that has affected members of Canada’s First Nations, who are dependent on these food sources. Moreover, the process feeds off itself: trees absorb
more light than tundra does and they emit that energy as heat, further warming
the atmosphere and reinforcing the very conditions that allow more spruce to
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flourish on the formerly treeless terrain. “These results are very relevant to the
current debate surrounding climate change,” Professor Danby noted, “because
they provide real evidence that vegetation change will be quite considerable in
response to future warming.”2
The scientific data, and their myriad implications, raise key questions
about how human institutions will respond to a human-generated crisis. This
is particularly relevant to those land-management agencies such as the U.S.
Forest Service that are responsible for innumerable bioregions and ecozones.
How will it steward its 193 million acres of forests and grasslands as the climate and landscape shift in relation to one another?3
That confounding question comes at a fascinating moment in the agency’s history. Established in 1905, in the immediate aftermath of its centennial
celebrations, the Forest Service found itself with a golden opportunity to consider whether its prior commitments will allow it to celebrate its bicentennial.
That may seem an odd statement. After all, the Forest Service has managed to
weather serious challenges in the past, a legacy suggesting that it might prove
as nimble when confronted with future trials, however unpredictable as those
global warming may pose. That said, the agency’s history may not be a useful
guide to a future layered with the dilemmas that a warmer earth is expected to
produce. But however traumatic climate change may be, however disruptive
its impact on the agency’s previous patterns of behavior and action, analyzing
its past still may provide insight into its future. How will its leaders, line officers, rangers, and staff daily face complexities posed by an integrated series of
forces that may overwhelm their capacity to manage landscapes? How will
they respond to the welter of opportunities and challenges that already have
emerged and will arise? These are not just policy questions but also have a
historical dimension, for as Richard Neustadt and Ernest May observe in
Thinking in Time: “Seeing the past can help one envision alternative futures.”4
This article is concerned with some of the alternative futures that the U.S.
Forest Service might face, in particular three possible paths that could redefine its structure and mission. For the sake of clarity, I have segregated the
three tracks, but in reality they might well merge or intersect at various points,
a speculative approach that is designed to provoke a larger discussion about
land management in an age of climate change.

scenario one: evolutionary dynamics
The Forest Service has evolved in relation to the lands that it manages, establishing a dynamic interaction between environment and the professional
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conservationists who seek to manage it, which confirms a broader claim:
“History has repeatedly demonstrated that the health and welfare of human
societies are fundamentally dependent on the health and welfare of their forests.” This reciprocity, in its particularity and broad sweep, may prove the key
to the agency’s long-term survival. Because over time it has had to adapt to
shifts in political temper, scientific knowledge, and social concern, the agency’s legacy of resilience also may define its twenty-first-century behavior,
enabling it to morph as required while retaining its core responsibilities and
organizational structure.5
The Forest Service’s creation depended on an argument about evolving
landscapes. Three maps illustrating an article by William B. Greeley, the agency’s third chief, make the case. Entitled “Virgin Forest Cover: 1620, 1850,
1920,” they tell a story of profound environmental change as the original forest cover of what would become the United States was cut down, and hints at
the Forest Service’s mitigatory role. Early U.S. foresters believed that America
in 1620 was virginal, so they could highlight the differences between those
Euro-American settlers, farmers, and industrialists who slashed their way
through ancient forests and latter-day Forest Service professionals, whose
function was to protect and steward the remaining resources.
In political terms, the Forest Service produced such images to convince
the nation that its work was critical to national security. To repair the land
required an organization whose mission was to restore what had been
destroyed. Replant, regenerate, repair: this would be the agency’s environmental ethos for its first forty years, from 1905 to 1945.
Yet embedded within that purpose was an intense anxiety, best captured
in a 1908 cartoon: “Uncle Sam as He May Appear in Twenty Years.” It depicts
a crew-cut Uncle Sam—with stumps standing in as hair stubble—who, like
Sampson, has been shorn of his power, too weak to maintain his authority
and expand his reach. Contemporaries understood that the United States was
on the cusp of imperial dominance. By 1910, the American gross national
product had exceeded the combined output of England, France, and Germany.
Yet in recognizing that they had the chance to supplant Europe, many Americans were also haunted by the specter that they would miss this opportunity
by acting as other empires had—by consuming and devastating their natural
resources at such a clip and to such an extent that their economy would
collapse along with their dreams of hegemonic power.6
Conservationists played a part in this wider cultural debate: their
descriptions of forest devastation and the resultant “timber famine” dovetailed with their prescription—to create a system of public lands dedicated to
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the practice of conservative resource management. This argument had
emerged in the aftermath of the publication of George Perkins Marsh’s seminal work, Man and Nature: Earth as Modified by Human Action (1864), and it
gained momentum in the 1870s and 1880s as the American Forestry Association, fishing and hunting clubs, and women’s groups agitated for regulatory
mechanisms to control resource exploitation. Their agitation had an impact:
in the 1870s, the Division of Forestry was created within the Department of
Agriculture. In 1891, Congress passed the Forest Reserve Act, granting the
president power “from time to time, [to] set apart and reserve in any State or
Territory having public land bearing forests … public reservation.” Within a
year, President Benjamin Harrison had set aside more than 13 million acres
as forest reserves, and his successor, Grover Cleveland, added another 5 million; by 1899, the number had swelled to 40 million. But it was not until 1897
that administrative control over these reserves was codified.7
President Theodore Roosevelt helped tip the balance in favor of conservation. Between 1901 and 1908, he added 110 million acres to the National
Forest System; he also signed off on the transfer of these lands from the
Department of the Interior to the Department of Agriculture, and he created
the Forest Service and appointed Gifford Pinchot as its first chief.
In short order, Pinchot and his peers used their legislative mandate to
train rangers to survey and map the lands within the boundaries of the
national forests. They also pressed for the resolution of legal challenges, which
ultimately led to Supreme Court decisions affirming the Forest Service’s statutory standing and authority to manage the forests and grasslands, and lobbied Congress for budget increases to match its expanded duties.
With the establishment of these boundaries—topographical, political,
and legal—the Forest Service went to work on its central managerial task
from 1905 until World War II, the regeneration of abused terrain in the west.
During the Great Depression, its charge widened to include gullied southern
farmlands. By World War II, the Forest Service’s engagement had proved
national in scope and local in significance; it had become the nation’s softhatted custodial agent.8
That hat hardened with the advent of global war and postwar prosperity.
Then its task was to get out the cut. In 1940, two billion board feet were harvested on the national forests; by 1960, the figure had zoomed upward,
topping out at twelve billion board feet in the late 1980s. This shift was of
incalculable importance and is perhaps best reflected in the controversies
that erupted in the 1970s over clear-cutting on Montana’s Bitterroot National
Forest and West Virginia’s Monongahela National Forest. For its supporters,
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clear-cutting signaled the agency’s newfound ability to harvest trees in oncedifficult terrain and its laudable ambition to turn natural forests into plantations.
For its critics, this was a dire reflection of the Forest Service’s technological
fixation. So intense did the debate become that even an internal task force
chided agency employees on the Bitterroot for acting as if “resource production goals come first and … land management considerations take second
place.”9
Protests over clear-cutting and the technological imperative provoked a
backlash against the Forest Service, sparking federal lawsuits, local demonstrations, and a welter of state and congressional inquiries. When the dust
had settled, a new legal environment had emerged. Among its most critical
components was the 1976 National Forest Management Act (NFMA), which
gave the public a much stronger role in determining forest planning and set
strict limits on the Forest Service’s clear-cutting practices.
The NFMA was the last in a remarkable series of landmark environmental initiatives. Beginning with the 1964 Wilderness Act, and including the
Wild and Scenic Rivers Act (1968), the National Environmental Policy Act
(1970), the various Clean Air and Clean Water Act amendments of the 1970s,
and the Endangered Species Act (1973), these bills constitute the second great
wave of environmental activism. The end result has been that these initiatives
regulate the very land-management regulatory agencies, such as the Forest
Service and the National Park Service, that had been established during the
first surge of environmental legislation, crafted in the Progressive Era.
Since these laws were adopted, the agency has appeared to be wandering
in the forest. Pounded in federal court, faced with drastic budget cuts and
sharp reductions in personnel, it has struggled to find its way, leading one
former chief to argue that it is mired in “analysis paralysis,” a logjam preventing it from doing its proper work. Complicating this struggle to define its
contemporary mission has been steep declines in timber harvests, escalating
population pressures along the urban-wildland interface, increased recreational use, intensifying forest fires, and serious water-management issues.
No wonder the agency’s morale is low.10
The Forest Service’s initiatives reflect this sometimes shaky sense of self.
“New Perspectives,” the rubric it employed to describe its 1980s policy
reforms, was succeeded by “Ecosystem Management” in the 1990s, which ten
years later became the “Four Threats,” Chief Dale Bosworth’s rhetorical device
to describe the new century’s major environmental issues: the loss of open
space, the buildup of fire and fuels, invasive species, and unmanaged recreation. The agency’s wavering commitments (real and perceived) are linked to
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the larger culture’s curious inability to embody the environmental principles
it purports to embrace. One example should suffice: through legal pressure
and political compromise, the public has forced the Forest Service to scale
back its timber harvests, from twelve billion board feet in the late 1980s to two
billion in 2007. Yet American demand for wood products has increased every
year for the past fifty years. We have accomplished this by a simple expedient—
outsourcing demand to Canada, Eastern Europe, southern Africa, and the
equatorial band of tropical rainforests, thus exporting our environmental
problems to other, often poorer, parts of the planet.11
Such myopia only roils the political context in which the Forest Service
operates. As Gifford Pinchot argued a century ago, the national forests “exist
today because the people want them. To make them accomplish the most
good the people themselves must make clear how they want them run.” Gaining that clarity has been difficult, hindering the agency’s ability to revise its
land-management practices on the national forests.
Still, a persuasive case can be made that what has appeared to be a lack of
coherent guidelines may simply be a necessary by-product of evolutionary
change. It is tough to decipher, in the midst of a transition, the precise nature
of that transition. The agency’s history supports this view. Its management of
resources, the emphasis of which has moved from grass to trees to water, has
revealed its ability, however constrained, to shift its ground, to adapt to
changes in politics and polity, ideas and images. That is how all organisms
survive.

scenario two: devolutionary progress
Yet sometimes the rate of change is so radical that organisms emerge as something else altogether. Indeed, a proposed alteration that the Forest Service has
faced—and to date has fended off—is the devolution of its lands and authority to the individual states in which its forests and grasslands are located.
Those who have argued for this outcome have drawn on a powerful strain in
American political thought, starting with the Tenth Amendment: “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by
it to the States, are reserved for the States respectively, or to the people.” In
attempting to define the precise relationship between federal and state sovereignty, a central issue in the United States since the eighteenth century, the
amendment actually makes clear that this relationship is in tension. The Forest Service knows this full well, for the agency long has been a flashpoint in
the heated political debate between states rights and national prerogatives.
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And with reason: in the early twentieth century, western critics of President Theodore Roosevelt alleged that his creation of the Forest Service and
the national forests were but a means to expand presidential authority. That is
why they erupted in anger when he withdrew 110 million acres from the public domain during his two administrations, sparking the first Sagebrush
Rebellion, which simmered between 1905 and 1908. Although the Supreme
Court legitimized the agency’s managerial control of these lands (and thus
implicitly supported Roosevelt’s actions) through a series of test cases resolved
in 1911, its decisions did not defuse western resentment. In the 1950s, western
livestock interests reignited the debate, but without success. No more successful was the 1990s “Wise Use” movement, which demanded that the federal government relinquish its rights to the national forests. Commissioners
in Nye County, Nevada, bulldozed Forest Service fences, and across the west
agency vehicles and offices were firebombed and vandalized. In this overheated environment, Pinchot, mocked in a 1908 cartoon entitled “Czar
Pinchot and his Cossack Rangers,” would have felt right at home.12
Although the states rights argument has never gained much traction in
the United States, it did in Canada and New Zealand, and an analysis of these
other countries’ experiences helps to set American land-management practices in an international context. Originally, each had followed a similar path
as the United States: in a federalized structure in which national and provincial governments maintained different levels of sovereignty, each country
established a national forest system under the management of a professional
forest service. Like the U.S. Forest Service, the Canadian and New Zealand
agencies were expected to oversee and maintain their valuable resource base.
That expectation is not surprising. Gifford Pinchot had been a strong proponent of the Canadian conservation movement, and all three societies had
adapted European ideas on how to regulate resource exploitation. Linked at
their creation, it would have been reasonable to suppose that the futures of
these three professional agencies also would have run in tandem.
That is not what happened. Founded in 1899, the Canadian Forest Service developed simultaneously with schools of forestry. The first of these, at
the University of Toronto, was directed by German-born forester Bernhard
Fernow, who had recently resigned as head of the U.S. Division of Forestry.
The graduates of these schools joined the new agency’s staff, and their scientific expertise shaped the organization’s managerial perspective; by 1924,
Canadian foresters had 9.2 million acres under management. Within six
years, this short-lived experiment in federal forestry was over. In 1930, as
the depression bore down, all national forest lands were returned to the
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provinces from which they had been appropriated originally, and the agency’s
budget and staff were cut drastically. The concept of a national agency with
land-management regulatory control never recovered. Over the years, the
Canadian Forest Service’s bureaucratic status has been downgraded from an
agency to a department, from a service to a division. It regained its departmental status in 1989, but a decade earlier had lost a critical part of its
research responsibilities when its forest products laboratories were privatized. Because it no longer has a land base or a scientific mission, the Canadian Forest Service now serves as a “navigator” for private and provincial
foresters and forests. Its mission statement reflects this change in function:
“The Canadian Forest Service promotes the sustainable development of
Canada’s forests and the competitiveness of the Canadian forest sector.” Not
everyone has been happy with its new role as a promoter or catalyst. As Ken
Druska and Bob Burt have observed, at “various points in its history, some
of its leaders or its critics have looked wistfully at its southern counterpart,
the U.S. Forest Service, with its vast national forest base, and its authoritative position in U.S. society.”13
New Zealand showed no such wistfulness when in the 1980s it embarked
on an even more rapid devolution of its public forests. The nation’s central
role in forestry had begun seven decades earlier. In 1913, after nearly a century
of largely unregulated and intense harvesting of native forests, a Royal Commission on Forestry was appointed to evaluate forest conditions, determine
which lands would remain in pubic control, define their purposes, and estimate future demand for timber and other resources. The commission concluded that New Zealand needed a commissioner of forestry and a professional
forest service that would manage the state-owned woods. Although World
War I delayed the implementation of these recommendations, by 1920 they
were enacted, new schools of forestry were established, and management
commenced. Sixty years later, the national government owned more than 50
percent of New Zealand’s commercial forests and it dominated the national
timber economy.
By 2000, that was no longer true: the government owned only 6 percent
of commercial forestland, 34 percent was held by Maori trusts, 3 percent was
under local control, and the largest ownership group was international timber companies. Corporate, for-profit forestry now was the law of the land.
Why and how had this rapid transition occurred? In 1986, the Labour
government, responding to the country’s sluggish economy, first corporatized,
then privatized, the resource agencies. One year later, the New Zealand Forest
Service was abolished and folded into a new Department of Conservation.
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The new Ministry of Forestry was, like its Canadian peer, to serve as a policy
shop, and the New Zealand Forestry Corporation gained control of the state’s
commercial forestry operations on 4.4 million hectares, focusing on marketdriven resource management and the creation of a profitable forest sector.14
Neither the Canadian nor the New Zealand model has been seriously
advocated in the United States. True, those who would like to reduce or eliminate the U.S. Forest Service’s regulatory clout have proposed transferring the
national forests to the states. But this proposal does not resemble the Canadian experience of returning lands to the provinces; the U.S. national forests
had always been federal property. Neither is it clear that the various states in
which national forests are sited would welcome a complete dismantling of the
federal presence. They might not have the budgets, staff, or political will to
maintain these invaluable lands.15
Much more plausible are calls for the creation of a cooperative conservation strategy in which local groups and federal land managers together
develop forest plans. This has a historical basis, too: Circular 21 (1898), which
promoted the agency’s cooperation with private landowners, found its analogue in other initiatives that encouraged forest rangers to discuss with local
communities and economic interests how best to manage the forests. More
recently, cooperative actions have been nurtured by the National Forest
Management Act and the Endangered Species Act, which require public
participation and interagency coordination. They have also been energized
by community environmental initiatives promoted at the 1997 Seventh
American Forest Congress. Bolstered by university-sponsored think-tanks,
such as the Public Policy Research Institute at the University of Montana,
they have launched several successful ventures, including the Quincy Library
Group (1992) and the New Ranch program developed by the Quivira Coalition (1997). The latter seeks to operate within what it calls the “radical
center—a neutral place where people could explore their interests instead of
argue their positions—and at the grassroots, literally the ‘grass’ and the ‘roots,’
where, we believed, trust needed to be built anew.”16
The “Lubrecht Conversations,” held outside Missoula, Montana, in
1998, shared this commitment to a “bottom-up” approach to national-policy
reform. Local consensus management would evolve to include wider watershed and bioregional perspectives that then would shape the national agenda.
Most captivating was the group’s call for the creation of a “virtual” Region 7
within the Forest Service wherein districts and forests would propose “to
develop practical collaborative decision-making processes at the local/
regional level, which might eventually evolve into a national restatement of
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basic mission.” If acceptable, the Forest Service would fund the experiment
but would not retain authority over its design or implementation.17
Although to date “Region 7” remains but a tantalizing idea, other experimental formats have been enacted. One on-the-ground example is the Valles
Caldera Trust (2000), a government-owned entity that provides management
and administrative services for the Valles Caldera National Preserve in northern New Mexico. This national preserve suggests the array of options that
have been emerging in timber towns and ranch country in response to
decades of political discord, legal wrangling, and bureaucratic entanglement.
This development received another push in August 2005, when the White
House Conference on Cooperative Conservation convened, a sign that community-oriented, collaborative conservation has captured considerable political interest and generated significant momentum.18
Whether this top-down support of grass-roots actions will be manifest in
long-term reform is uncertain. But the incremental development, innovative
perspectives, and experimental character of these projects give them a much
greater chance of success in revising the reigning principles of public land
management in the United States than anything advocated by the Wise Use
movement or modeled in the devolutionary actions of Canada and New
Zealand.19

scenario three: revolutionary impulse
The creation of a new Department of Conservation in the executive branch,
by contrast, would expand the federal managerial presence and its regulatory
authority. With a seat in the cabinet, this department would house the nation’s
most important land-management agencies—the Bureau of Land Management, the Bureau of Reclamation, the Fish and Wildlife Service, the Forest
Service, the Geological Survey, the National Resources Conservation Service,
and the National Park Service, among other entities. By creating economies
of scale and greater efficiencies of action, this new department would save
money and would serve as a standard bearer for the modern environmental
movement.
Such an approach flies in the face of contemporary environmentalism,
which stresses local agency over national solutions. Yet an unreflective dismissal of this possibility may lead conservationists to miss a chance to restructure federal land-management institutions and their delivery of environmental
services. It may turn out that the most effective way to secure much-desired
bottom-up reform is through simultaneous top-down change.
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That said, none of the previous efforts to establish a Department of Conservation has been successful. When the Forest Service was created in 1905, it,
like its progenitor, the Bureau of Forestry, was located in the Department of
Agriculture. The nation’s forests, however, were administered in the Department of the Interior. To bring the foresters and the forests together, Gifford
Pinchot faced two choices: shift his tiny staff to Interior, to be united there
with the national forest reserves, or seek the transfer of millions of forested
acres from one cabinet department to another. Because he was convinced that
Interior’s history of corruption would compromise the newly formed Forest
Service, he chose the latter path. Seven years after he inaugurated discussions
in 1898, Congress and Interior signed off on the transfer.
The Department of the Interior has been trying to recover these lost acres
ever since. In the 1920s, Interior secretary Albert Fall pushed for the transfer
of the Forest Service and its forests, but he failed when he was implicated in
and later jailed for his participation in the Teapot Dome scandal. Ten years
later, Harold Ickes, Franklin D. Roosevelt’s innovative and pugnacious secretary of the Interior, proposed a Department of Conservation as part of a
broader New Deal scheme to reorganize the executive branch. His bid revolved
around moving the Forest Service and national forests to Interior and pulling
in other federal land-management agencies under one roof. This restructuring, he believed, would enable those who worked on soils to talk with those
who worked with trees, hydrologists with botanists. In trying to finesse turf
wars, Ickes ignited a contentious political brawl that damaged the Roosevelt
administration.20
In anticipation of such potential problems, President Roosevelt had
informed Secretary of Agriculture Harry A. Wallace in 1933–34 that he must
not publicly protest or privately fight the Forest Service’s impending transfer.
Roosevelt also required Wallace to gag Ferdinand Silcox, chief of the Forest
Service. Through back channels, Silcox asked sixty-eight-year-old Gifford
Pinchot to come to the agency’s aid, a request Pinchot gladly accepted. Over
the next seven years, Pinchot and Ickes engaged in a titanic struggle inside
and outside Washington. Over the radio, through newspaper columns, and
before any audience that would listen to them, the former friends blasted
each other. Pinchot’s reasoning was simple: if he whipped up a storm of protest, he might force the president to recalibrate the costs associated with Ickes’s
concept. By the late 1930s, after pouring tens of thousands of dollars of his
money into the campaign and creating an aggressive lobbying force of fellow
conservationists and western legislators, Pinchot forced Roosevelt to capitulate. In 1940, while meeting with the so-called Forest Lobby, a group of senators
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and representatives from timber-producing states, Roosevelt tore up the
executive order authorizing the transfer of the Forest Service.
Although Pinchot frustrated Ickes’s plans, the two men’s battle royal
obscured a larger issue: what was the best way to organize the management of
the public lands? Would Ickes’s vision of an integrated Department of Conservation have provided a more comprehensive leadership for and efficient
stewardship of the nation’s forests, rivers, and grasslands? We will never know,
but the alluring idea of a unified conservation department has continued to
attract adherents. In the early 1970s, the Nixon administration, at the same
time it advocated the creation of the Environmental Protection Agency,
pushed for the establishment of a Department of Natural Resources that
would have been merged with Interior. The idea failed in part because Russell
Train, head of the Environmental Protection Agency, argued against it. “There
was some logic [to the idea,]” he recalled in 2006, “but I testified against it,
against building a bigger bureaucracy. I was opposed to burying environmental responsibility in a big conglomeration with everything from Indian affairs
to reclamation. The environment would have been submerged.”21
Undaunted, President Jimmy Carter also floated the idea of a Department of Natural Resources in concert with his plan to create a Department of
Energy; each would absorb disparate agencies and offer a more cost-effective
and integrated management. Energy became a cabinet-level position in 1977,
but Natural Resources did not get beyond the discussion stage.22
Despite the failure of these various presidents to create a conservation
superagency, there are signs that an integration of agency function is under
way. In 1997, Congress authorized a program called Service First: Working
Together, in which the Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Management
were authorized to merge various functions. One such joint venture is the
Durango Public Lands Center. Through it, the two agencies manage their
lands in southwestern Colorado. The leadership of the San Juan National Forest and the San Juan Field BLM Office, like the twelve-person staff, is “cross
delegated.” Because each employee is responsible for “all aspects of the two
agencies’ work and is equally responsible to the USFS Regional Forester and
BLM State Director,” because each is required to be fluent in both agencies’
statutory regulations and wears the two uniforms, this is an innovative, even
unusual, arrangement. The San Juan is “the only organization in the country
with a single team providing leadership in all aspects of land management
and public service for the two federal agencies.”23
These interchanges are part of a larger attempt to merge scarce skills and
resources among the nation’s land-management agencies. Forest policy expert
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Sally K. Fairfax has argued that more should be done to facilitate the convergence of the identities and missions of these agencies. Noting that “the historic distinctions and feuds” between the Forest Service, the National Park
Service, and the Bureau of Land Management “no longer matter,” she observes:
“The hostility between the advocates of forest reserves and park reserves that
began before either agency was formed conceals the fact that for most of their
existence, they have been more alike than not. As timber fades as a Forest
Service preoccupation, and recreation emerges as dominant [in] present and
future concerns, the justifications for having multiple and distinct federal
management agencies fade as well.”24
Lending further credence to her argument is a November 2006 Memorandum of Understanding that the Bureau of Land Management and the Forest Service signed in partnership with the Fish and Wildlife Service and the
National Park Service. It committed the four agencies “to carry out shared or
joint management activities to achieve mutually beneficial resource management goals.” Service First authority has been utilized primarily for merging
offices, issuing joint permits, sharing management, and creating single points
of contact for resource programs. Given the patchwork of lands each agency
manages and the proximity of their holdings, this integrative approach makes
considerable sense, so much so that the Bureau of Indian Affairs, the Bureau
of Reclamation, and the Army Corps of Engineers are considering seeking
Service First authorization. In this incremental fashion, the dream of a
Department of Conservation that has eluded several presidents and innumerable policy analysts might well come into being.25

future focus
Separately, none of the three scenarios sketched out here—evolution, devolution, revolution—will have much chance of redefining the Forest Service’s
twenty-first-century structure or its guiding perspectives. None of these
possibilities will be achieved without reference to or in combination with
the others. Moreover, although any change in the agency’s land-management mission will require internal support from the leadership and staff of
the Forest Service, the real locus of any such transformation lies in Congress and the executive branch. That is what Roger Sedjo, senior fellow at
Resources for the Future, had in mind when he noted in 2000 that the Forest Service “no longer controls national forest policy. Instead, mandatory
provisions of the law and regulations … mean that the regional and local
landscapes, watersheds, and their resources are now the focus of attention.”
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Because the assessments of the viability of these resources shape policy, the
Forest Service and other public land-management agencies now “lack the
institutional capacity and authority to fully develop and implement ecosystem conservation agendas and resource management programs.” That these
organizations lack the necessary clout is tied to their inability “to interpret
and respond effectively to the public’s priorities regarding national forest
management.”26
To regain the capacity to listen to the citizenry and address its varied concerns, the Forest Service needs only to recall the words Gifford Pinchot uttered
in 1907, when the nation’s forest reserves were renamed the national forests.
These public lands were, he asserted, “made for and owned by the people. They
should also be managed by the people. … This means that if National Forests
are going to accomplish anything worthwhile the people must know all about
them and must take a very active role in their management.”
Despite his conviction that democratic debate was essential to public
land management, Pinchot knew that the collaborative process of defining
and achieving conservation stewardship of the national forests would never
be easy. He also knew that that was the only way to safeguard these precious
assets, a matter of even more pressing obligation in this vexing climate of
change.
Pomona College
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